ICL plastics factory explosion - report published

The report details the conclusions of the Public Inquiry that was set up to consider the circumstances leading up to, and the health & safety and regulatory issues arising from, the explosion. This report is the culmination of the first joint Inquiry by both the Scottish Government and UK Government. The publication of the report has gained substantial media attention. The explosion, which has been described as the worst industrial disaster since Piper Alpha, occurred on 11 May 2004. Nine people died and thirty-three were injured.

The explosion was caused by faulty Liquid Petroleum Gas (“LPG”) pipes buried underground.

The Inquiry report, delivered by the Chairman Lord Gill on 1 July 2009, was published by Ministers on Wednesday 16 July 2009.

The main points of the report are as follows:

• The explosion was avoidable. The metallic underground LPG pipe was “out of sight and out of mind.” It was inadequately protected when buried.
• The management of the ICL companies did not have sufficient knowledge and understanding. They did not realise that LPG was heavier than air and when escaping will track to accumulate at the lowest point in drains and voids, presenting the danger of an explosion. The risks posed in the premises were not identified and not understood.
• There are serious weaknesses in the existing UK Health & Safety regime due to the complexity of the legislation. There was a lack of effective communication between the HSE, the trade association of the LPG industry “UKLPG” and suppliers and users of LPG on safety issues.
• The HSE’s oversight of ICL had been deficient in certain aspects. There was a failure to appreciate the significance of buried pipework and a failure to pursue follow-up visits promptly.

The Inquiry stated that the circumstances are not a-typical of bulk storage LPG users more widely.

The recommendations seek a modern LPG safety regime to minimise the risk of recurrence. This safety regime should be simple and should not involve a need for primary legislation or an increased burden on the HSE.

Lord Gill recommends a four phase action plan for all bulk LPG installations in commercial and industrial premises. This plan consists of systematic replacement of underground pipes with polyethylene and a permanent system by which safety questions can be reviewed on an industry wide basis with effective communication from the HSE. However, the primary responsibility for LPG safety continues to lie with the site user as the person who creates the risk.

To read the report please click here.